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I.  Introduction 
 
Every voting system must protect against a variety of security threats. 
It is the essential purpose of any voting system to provide evidence 
that its stated outcomes are correct, even in the face of adversaries who 
may wish to tamper with it. Every voting system must also provide 
usability and accessibility features, because errors in human voters’ 
operation of the voting system can lead to changes in the outcome, 
particularly if the margin of victory is smaller than the margin of 
human error.  
 
In the early 2000’s, paperless electronic voting systems gained 
prominence for their ability to offer important accessibility features 
(e.g., optionally large text, button boxes, multiple languages, 
headphones), but these systems also created unacceptable security 
vulnerabilities.1 Tampered or even buggy software could corrupt or 
destroy all evidence of voters’ original intent.2 
 
Electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs) would seem to bridge the 
gap between the fundamental security properties of paper, which 
cannot be overwritten or tampered by any computer and thus create the 
potential for elections to be software independent, and the variety of 
usability features available with computers, which cannot be provided 
in an equivalent manner by paper-and-pen. BMDs thus have the 
potential to provide the best of both worlds.  
 
Recently, Andrew Appel, Richard DeMillo, and Phillip Stark 
(hereafter, “ADS”) staked out some important security claims, arguing 





1 Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, & Dan S. Wallach, Analysis 
of an Electronic Voting System, in PROC. OF IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY & 
PRIVACY (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Andrew W. Appel, Richard DeMillo, & Philip B. Stark, Ballot-Marking Devices 
(BMDs) Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters (April 12, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3375755. 
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neither notice deliberate errors, nor even if they do notice will they 
have any meaningful proof of the BMD’s misbehavior.4 
  
We need to consider exactly how often a voter might notice an error, 
what common electoral processes will do next, and how they might be 
enhanced. We’ll also need to discuss the properties of hand-marked 
paper ballots, considered by ADS and many others to be the “gold 
standard” for election security.  
 
a. Why not just mark ballots by hand? 
 
A central question, posited by many election integrity activists, is why 
we don’t just stick with hand-marked paper ballots. This question is 
important to address directly.  
 
● Not every voter has the ability to do all the tasks necessary to 
read, mark, and cast a paper ballot. Some voters have low 
vision or zero vision. Some voters have limited motor control. 
Some voters are illiterate or dyslexic. Some voters have 
multiple such issues. BMDs have the potential to make voting 
far more accessible to these populations. BMDs can also offer 
a variety of different languages, both in text and voice, offering 
greater assistance to non-native English speakers. Furthermore, 
Federal and state laws generally make these features 
mandatory.  
● Ballot marking devices also have the advantage of eliminating 
complete classes of voting errors that can occur with hand-
marked paper ballots. For example, with a BMD it is 
impossible to “overvote”;5 the BMD can enforce common rules 
like “only one vote per contest.”6 Enforcing such rules is even 






5 See, e.g., UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2015 VOLUNTARY 
VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES 45-46 (2015) [hereinafter VVSG], 
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/VVSG.1.1.VOL.1.FINAL1.p
df (using the term “EBM” (electronically-assisted ballot marker) where we use 
“BMD”).  
6 Id. 
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selections in a contest, such as rank-choice or instant-runoff 
voting. BMDs additionally do not allow voters to make stray or 
ambiguous marks, since everything on the paper was printed by 
the computer. If a voter needs to change their mind after the 
ballot is printed, they can “spoil” it and start over again.7 For 
contrast, consider the 2008 recount of the very close Minnesota 
Senate race between Coleman and Franken.8 Ambiguous hand-
marked ballots were individually considered in litigation after 
the election.9  
● A well-designed BMD can also help every voter accurately 
convey their intent. For example, a BMD will commonly have 
a confirmation screen at the end of the process that can 
highlight contests that a voter might have accidentally 
skipped.10 Features like this become even more important as 
ballots grow longer and more complicated. Likewise, a BMD 
does not face the space constraints of a hand-marked paper 
ballot, allowing each question to appear on a separate screen, 
and thus help prevent voters from accidentally skipping over a 
contest. For contrast, consider the paper ballot in Broward 
County, Florida in 2018, where the contests for U.S. Senate 
and Congressional Representative were placed under the long 
ballot instructions in the left column, leading a potentially 





7 Procedures for voters to spoil their ballots vary from state to state. In Texas, for 
example, voters are entitled to no more than three attempts at filling out a ballot. See 
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 64.007(b) (West 1986).  




10 VVSG, supra note 5, at 46-47. 
11 Appel has written a summary of this issue in Florida 2018, alongside other famous 
ballot layout failures. Andrew Appel, Florida is the Florida of Ballot-Design 
Mistakes, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 14, 2018), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/2018/11/14/florida-is-the-florida-of-ballot-design-mistakes/ 
[https://perma.cc/6E7G-ND64]. Bad ballot layout can induce high undervote rates in 
any voting technology, but at least BMDs can operate without the constraint of 
compressing a lengthy ballot to fit onto a sheet of paper. 
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● An important nationwide trend is the consolidation of polling 
places, both for early voting and on election days. Such “vote 
centers” allow any voter to cast any one of potentially 
thousands of distinct ballot styles. To run a vote center with 
hand-marked paper ballots, this requires having laser printers 
for “ballot on demand” printing.12 Unfortunately, laser printers 
have their own issues. Most notably, they require a significant 
power draw (i.e., several kilowatts) to warm up the toner drum, 
which might be unavailable in some locations. Similarly, 
consumer-grade UPS (uninterrupted power supply) devices 
may have inadequate power for a laser printer.13 If the power 
goes out, and a UPS isn’t sized to handle the laser printer, the 
election is dead in the water. Conversely, BMDs generally use 
thermal printers, which are low power and have no 
consumables like ink or toner cartridges14. Commercial BMDs 
have (or should have) enough battery to run for hours without 
power. BMD-based elections will be more robust in the face of 
power failures.  
 
Consequently, a fundamental challenge we face in any BMD 
implementation is trying to combine the security properties of hand-
marked paper ballots with the usability and operational benefits of a 
BMD. In Section II, we try to define BMDs. In Section III, we 
consider how we might model the threat and what we might hope to 





12 See, e.g., Ballot on Demand Solution, ELECTION SYS. & SOFTWARE, 
https://www.essvote.com/products/ballot-on-demand/ [https://perma.cc/VSG8-
TSEQ].  
13 See, e.g., Tony, APC Battery Backup for Laser Printer, EXCESSUPS (Feb. 6, 
2012), https://excessups.com/blog/guides/apc-battery-backup-to-protect-laser-
printer/ [https://perma.cc/C88B-NSME]. 
14 Direct thermal printers are commonly used to print restaurant and other “point of 
sale” receipts. They typically use an array of fixed heating elements. As the paper 
moves by, if it touches a hot element, the paper turns black. The paper, itself, has a 
temperature-sensitive coating to make this work. Consequently, there are no 
consumable inks or toners. See, e.g.,  Difference between Direct Thermal and 
Thermal Transfer Printing, ONLINE LABELS (June 2019), 
https://www.onlinelabels.com/articles/direct-thermal-vs-thermal-transfer.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V4PX-54RX]. 
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process and analyze how likely it might be to detect misbehaving 
BMDs. In Section V, we consider attackers’ ability to hide malicious 
behavior and the ability for an election official to detect it, such as by 
observing anomalously high rates of spoiled ballots. In Section VI, we 
consider how an election official might be able to tactically improve 
their chances of catching malware. In Section VII, we consider a 
variety of other arguments that have been made, including the question 
of why BMDs might or might not be preferable to hand-marked paper 
ballots. We conclude in Section VIII. 
 
II. What, exactly, is a BMD? 
 
Fundamentally, a BMD is a device that knows about all the different 
ballot styles that a voter might see. By inserting an unfilled ballot, or 
perhaps a blank sheet of paper with only a barcode indicating the 
specific ballot style, the BMD can then present a touch-screen 
interface to the voter to select their choices.15 BMDs typically include 
a variety of accessibility features (button boxes, headphones with 
audio output, font size settings, and other features as a supplement to 
the touch-screen), allowing a larger number of voters to operate these 
devices without assistance.16 When the voter is finished, the BMD 
does what its name says: it prints a marked ballot.17  
 
After that, BMDs come in two varieties: stateful and stateless.18 The 
former retains an electronic copy of every ballot, while the latter 
promptly forgets what it saw and starts over again. Stateful BMDs 
might allow for faster tallies, and provide redundancy against 





15 VVSG, supra note 5, at 34-35. 
16 Id. at 63-76. 
17 Id. at 46-47. 
18 Id. at 144-151. What we refer to as a “stateful BMD” would be classified as a 
“VVPAT” (voter-verified paper audit trail system) by the VVSG standards, 
subjecting the system to additional engineering requirements. 
19 See, e.g., Stacy Fernández, A Ballot Box Found Weeks After Election Day has 
Flipped a $569 Million School Bond Vote in Midland, TEX. TRIBUNE (Jan. 17, 2020, 
6:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/01/17/lost-midland-ballot-box-flips-
569-million-school-bond-election/ [https://perma.cc/J5N2-9PPG]. 
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be simpler to construct and provide stronger guarantees against the 
impact of malware within the machine.  
 
What happens with the paper ballots after they are printed varies from 
vendor to vendor. Typically, the voter will carry it by hand to a ballot 
box, which then has a scanner on top.20 For hand-marked ballots, these 
scanners can flag common error modes, including when a voter has 
indicated more than one vote in a contest which allows at most one 
vote (i.e., “overvoting,” which can never happen with a BMD, but is 
possible with hand-marked paper).21 Some vendors offer “privacy 
sleeves” to allow poll workers to do this operation on behalf of voters 
who do not have the necessary manual dexterity, while still preserving 
the voter’s privacy.22 One system, Los Angeles County’s VSAP, has 
the printer and ballot box integrated together, so that the entire process 
can be completed independently and privately.23 
 
Integrating the printing and casting would seem to have desirable 
usability properties, particularly for voters with limited manual 
dexterity. However, such BMDs create additional security concerns, 
where a BMD might print something contrary to the voter’s stated 
desires and automatically cast it without any opportunity for the voter 
to intervene.24  
 
The rest of this paper will focus primarily on stateless BMDs, wherein 
the paper ballot is the only way to know the voter’s intent, and where 





20 VVSG Vol 1, Version 1.1, section 3.2.2.2, pp. 48-49. These scanners are commonly 
referred to as “precinct count optical scanners” (PCOS). 
21 Id. at 45. 
22 Id. at 49-50. 
23 Review L.A. County’s 2020 Election Administration Plan, VSAP, 
https://vsap.lavote.net/ [https://perma.cc/B5M5-EQPQ].  
24 Andrew W. Appel, Serious Design Flaw in ESS ExpressVote Touchscreen: 
“Permission to Cheat”, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 14,2018), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/2018/09/14/serious-design-flaw-in-ess-expressvote-touchscreen-
permission-to-cheat/ [https://perma.cc/U7LN-Q7DX]. 
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physically distinct ballot box.25 This simplifies the discussion, and 
makes it clear exactly what “the ballot” actually is. In particular, this 
makes it clear what happens during a recount, where “recounting the 
ballots” means looking at paper ballots, not electronic records. This 
also simplifies our discussion of what it means to “cast” a ballot.  
 
III. Threat and audit models 
 
Every BMD is just a computer. Like any computer, it might have bugs 
in its software that don’t turn up in testing and might then impact the 
voter’s experience. Also, like any computer, its software could include 
malware, not intended by the manufacturer or election official to be 
present, but perhaps surreptitiously inserted when nobody was looking. 
Plenty of opportunities for this exist in modern elections, where voting 
machines may be delivered days or weeks in advance of an election.26  
 
In the mid-2000’s, researchers were concerned with how this sort of 
attack might play out with paperless electronic voting systems (which 
typically went by the unwieldy acronym “direct recording 
electronic”—DRE), since a voting machine might appear to be 
operating correctly, displaying exactly what the voter intended, but 
secretly record the ballot internally in a very different fashion.27 A 
related issue is that a paperless electronic system can also retain the 
ballots in the order cast, or randomize them in a reversible fashion, 
allowing ballot secrecy to be compromised by anybody who observes 






25 VVSG, supra note 5, at 48-49. These scanners are commonly referred to as 
“precinct-count optional scanners” (PCOS). 
26 This is colloquially referred to as the “sleepover voting machine problem”. A 
variety of physical security protocols have been deployed to mitigate these threats, 
but this is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Anahad, O’Connor, Mom, Can 
My Voting Machine Spend the Night?, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE BLOG (Aug. 19, 2008, 
1:59 PM) https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/mom-can-my-voting-
machine-spend-the-night/ [https://perma.cc/6MMG-M7U7],  
27 Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin, & Wallach, supra note 1, at 2 (2004). 
28 Id. at 16.  
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The mitigations that were used against these attacks, at the time, were 
not particularly impressive. Logic and accuracy testing (commonly 
shortened to “L&A”), conducted prior to the start of the election, 
would run a small and predetermined set of tests votes through the 
machine, verifying that the proper tally appeared at the end.29 Of 
course, if the machines watched their internal clocks, they could 
behave correctly while under test and then be malicious only on 
Election Day. Similarly, the number of votes used in L&A is typically 
much smaller than will appear in a real election, providing additional 
opportunities for a voting machine to distinguish between test 
conditions and a real election, and thus behave properly during L&A.30  
 
A more aggressive mitigation, only used in a handful of jurisdictions, 
was to conduct a parallel test.31 With this, some fraction of the voting 
machine population is randomly selected and then, rather than being 
deployed to the field, is instead set up in the elections warehouse 
where an operator enters a full day’s worth of votes according to a 
script.32 As with L&A, the post-election tally from these machines 
under test has a known correct outcome and any deviation from this 
would indicate a serious problem.33 Because no real votes are being 
cast, video can also be captured to ensure that operator data-entry 
errors can be differentiated from malicious vote flips.34  
A thought experiment on how to defeat this, which can possibly be 
attributed to Avi Rubin, is to have a secret knock.35 This is an input 









30 Ariel J. Feldman, Alex J. Halderman, & Edward Felten, Security Analysis of the 
Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine, CTR. INFOR. TECH. POL’Y (2006). 
31 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: PROTECTING 
ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD 18 (2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/Machinery%20of%20Democracy.pdf. 
32 Id. at 72.  
33 Id. at 122 
34 Id. at 52.  
35 See AVI RUBIN, BRAVE NEW BALLOT: THE BATTLE TO SAFEGUARD DEMOCRACY 
IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING (Morgan Road Books, New York, 2006). 
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would look for.36 The canonical example is a write-in vote for Mickey 
Mouse, although that might well happen in practice, so an attacker 
would need to select something more obscure. The general idea, then, 
is that the malware will act identically to the legitimate software until 
it sees the secret knock, and only then start misbehaving.37 This would 
be effectively undetectable without potentially destructive forensic 
testing, although it requires co-conspirators to perform the secret 
knock during the real election, creating significant risks for the 
conspiracy.  
 
a. Would all these attacks and defenses still work in a 
BMD? 
 
This is the crux of ADS’s argument. Malicious software in a BMD can 
certainly show one thing on the screen and print something else on the 
paper. This is particularly troublesome with some vendors who print 
two different encodings of the ballot: barcodes for machine-readable 
data and printed text for humans. While voters can verify the printed 
text, no voter will be able to detect errors in the barcodes. Let’s call 
this an “inconsistent barcode” attack. Alternatively, the machine might 
produce a completely consistent paper ballot (i.e., the barcode and the 
human-readable text are in total agreement), but the paper ballot 
differs from what the voter entered on the touchscreen. Let’s call that a 
“switched-intent” attack.  
 
There’s a very simple solution to the inconsistent barcode attack: get 
rid of the barcodes and have the only record of the voter’s intent be 
human-readable text. Any computer-printed text that’s readable by a 
voter will also be readable by a computer scanner with exceptionally 
high accuracy.38 While many current BMDs do not operate this way, 
this can be addressed through regulatory mandates and software 







38 To achieve the necessary accuracy, the OCR software likely needs to use state-of-
the-art “deep learning” techniques. Until such an OCR technology can be proven out 
in practice, barcodes will be necessary as a bridging technology. 




b. Auditing and inconsistent ballot detection 
 
So long as paper ballots have both human-readable text and a barcode, 
we need to consider how existing audit processes can be adapted to 
detect these attacks. A number of audit processes, including recounts 
and risk limiting audits (RLAs), provide these opportunities.  
 
If even a single ballot is inconsistent, that’s evidence of a serious 
problem—either a major software bug or an inconsistent-barcode 
security attack—that would require emergency procedures.39  Because 
of this, inconsistent barcode attacks are unlikely to be mounted by 
attackers in the real world, because even a single inconsistent ballot 
represents incontrovertible evidence that something has gone wrong. 
Attackers who wish to quietly manipulate an election outcome would 
not want to leave this kind of evidence so easily available for 
discovery.  
 
What about a switched intent attack then? This seems preferable for an 
attacker, since it’s not immediately obvious when it occurs. How can 
we discover one? ADS base their argument against such discoveries on 
three factors: that voters are unlikely to notice these attacks, that even 
if a voter does discover such an attack there is no good process to 
respond to such discoveries, and that there’s no alternative process in 
place that might reliably detect the attacks. 
  
c. Will voters notice a switched intent attack? 
 
A number of studies were conducted at Rice,40 where researchers 





39 See infra Section VI.A for discussion of such emergency procedures. 
40 See Bryan A. Campbell & Michael D. Byrne, Now do Voters Notice Review 
Screen Anomalies? A Look at Voting System Usability, Presented at Electronic 
Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2009, (Aug. 10 2009), 
http://chil.rice.edu/research/pdf/CampbellByrne_EVT_(2009).pdf; see also Sarah P. 
Everett, The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes can be 
Changed Without Detection (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Rice 
University) (on file with Rice University).  
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summary screen. Their goal was to detect how many research 
participants, drawn from the local population, would notice that the 
machine changed their inputs and would then go back and fix their 
“mistake.”41 Depending on exactly how they set up the experiment, 
between 1/3 and 1/2 of the voters noticed the introduced errors.42  
 
In most of these experiments, the participants were given made-up 
names on a printed sheet and asked to vote for them.43 It’s entirely 
possible that with real candidate names, in a real election, particularly 
at the top of the ticket where name recognition will be higher, voters 
might be more likely to notice discrepancies. This suggests that, if 
there were systemic vote flipping malware, something that tried to 
move thousands or tens-of-thousands of votes, we would have large 
numbers of regular voters who recognize the error when it happens.  
 
A more recent manuscript by Richard DeMillo et al. describes two 
studies.44 The first considers timing data from observed live voters.45 
The second presents results from an exit survey of voters, presented 
with a blank ballot and asked if it was equal to the actual ballot they 
voted.46 Neither of these were controlled studies, so their observations 
are unreliable for predicting verification rates.  
 
What might happen if a voter notices an error on a printed BMD? 
Most voters will likely head back to the poll workers’ table, perhaps 
sheepishly admit to having made a mistake, and request a chance to 
repeat the process with a fresh ballot. This process, commonly called 
ballot spoiling, is a completely standard part of any election process 
involving paper ballots. In Texas, for example, a voter is entitled to 





41 Campbell & Byrne, supra note 40, at 1; Everett, supra note 40 at 4-5. 
42 Campbell & Byrne, supra note 40 at 1; Everett, supra note 40 at 4. 
43 Campbell & Byrne, supra note 40 at 5; Everett, supra note 40 at 42. 
44 Richard DeMillo et al., What Voters are Asked to Verify Affects Ballot 
Verification: A Quantitative Analysis of Voters’ Memories of Their Ballots 1 (April 
13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3292208.  
45 Id. at 7.  
46 Id. at 8.  
47 Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 64.007 (West 1987). 




We can expect there to be a certain background rate of spoiled ballots, 
no matter the accuracy of the ballot marking devices, so it’s only when 
the spoilage rate gets reliably above the background rate that we’ll 
have a useful signal. Clearly, poll workers need to track every time a 
voter spoils a ballot and election administrators need this data 
available as the election is ongoing, giving them real-time situational 
awareness of problems as they manifest.  
 
Given all this information, what should an election official do when 
the spoiled ballot rate is higher than expected? Preferably, they would 
have a variety of different responses available, from deploying 
additional auditors to more serious emergency procedures.48  
 
IV. Live auditing of BMDs 
 
Election officials need procedures for conducting audits on BMDs, in 
the field, while the election is ongoing. Because BMDs retain no 
internal memory of cast votes, the only hard requirement for 
conducting any sort of live audit is that any ballots printed during the 
audit must be kept out of the ballot box, which is basically the same 
process used for a spoiled ballot.49 Such a process will be naturally 
transparent to voters or election observers, who would be free to 
witness the process.  
 
Who should conduct the audits? Audits might be conducted by poll 
workers, as part of their regular duties, or they might be conducted by 
dedicated auditors, working for the election administration, driving 
from one polling location to another during the election period. The 
essential attributes of a good auditing process are that “enough” tests 
are conducted to observe rare events, and that these tests are 
sufficiently random that a malicious BMD has no way to reliably 






48 See infra Section V.D for discussion of the actual likelihood of such detection. 
49 Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 64.007. Similar rules should apply in every state. 
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If a BMD is going to misbehave, the auditor will have a chance to 
catch it. And if any auditor, anywhere in the county, catches even one 
malicious machine in the act, the game is over. Call the police; we’ve 
got evidence of a serious crime.50  
 
This idea of live auditing has been around since at least Benaloh’s 
challenge mechanism,51 and was quickly adopted by research voting 
systems like Helios52 and VoteBox.53 Even without cryptography, the 
concept is the same. We wish to test a machine to prove that it is 
generating correct output. The machine does not know that it is being 
tested. The machine must commit to its output, and then we can verify 
the correctness of that output, or alternatively arrive at concrete proof 





50 See infra Section VI.A for a discussion of emergency procedures. 
51 Josh Benaloh, Simple Verifiable Elections, presented at the USENIX/ACCURATE 
Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT ’06) (June 14, 2006), 
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt06/tech/full_papers/benaloh/benaloh.pdf; 
Josh Benaloh, Ballot Casting Assurance via Voter-Initiated Poll Station Auditing, 
presented at the 2nd USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology 
Workshop (EVT ’07)(Jun. 28 2007), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.446.6091&rep=rep1&type
=pdf. 
52 See Ben Adida, Helios: Web-Based Open-Audit Voting, 17TH USENIX SECURITY 
SYMPOSIUM 335 (2008), 
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec08/tech/full_papers/adida/adida.pdf; see 
also Ben Adida et al., Electing a University President using Open-Audit Voting: 
Analysis of Real-World use of Helios, presented at Electronic Voting Technology 
Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ‘09) (June 25, 2009), 
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evtwote09/tech/full_papers/adida-helios.pdf. 
53 Daniel Sandler & Dan S. Wallach, Casting Votes in the Auditorium, Presented at 
the 2nd USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Tech. Workshop (Aug. 6, 2007), 
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/sandler/sandler.pdf; 
Daniel R. Sandler, Kyle Derr & Dan S. Wallach, VoteBox: A Tamper-Evident, 
Verifiable Electronic Voting System, 17TH USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 349, 349 
(2008), 
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec08/tech/full_papers/sandler/sandler.pdf. 




a. Baseline audits 
 
An election director must conduct some amount of auditing no matter 
what, and in the event suspiciously high spoiled ballot rates are 
reported, the election director might adaptively deploy more auditors.  
 
What is the probability of catching at least one malicious machine in 
the act? The math is straightforward. Let us say that a malicious BMD 
does a switched intent attack with probability p. A randomly audited 
machine would then be caught cheating, again with probability p. 
Equivalently, the BMD gets away with its malice with probability 1 − 
p. The probability of the BMD getting away with it after n audits is 
then (1 − p)n. The probability of detecting the malware is 1 − (1 − p)n. 
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Table 1, above, shows some real numbers for p and n. Gilbert has also 
suggested an auditing process like this.54  
 
From this, we can see that if the attacker wishes to modify only 1% of 
the ballots, an election official wishing to detect such an attack will 
need to conduct somewhere above 300 audits. To achieve a 99% 
confidence of detecting the attack, 468 audits would be necessary.  
 
Of particular note, the probability of detecting a switched-intent attack 
has no dependency on the number of votes cast in the election. This 
means that the proportional cost of reaching a given detection 
probability shrinks as the voting population grows.  
 
V. Non-uniform malicious behavior 
 
After a Twitter discussion of this idea, Stark wrote two drafts of an 
essay in response.55 This section responds to some of his arguments.  
 
Stark’s strongest claim is that the adversary can be far more selective 
about which voters to attack.56 For example, the attacker might only 
tamper with ballots for voters who operate very slowly, far more 
slowly than any auditor. Similarly, an attacker might only tamper with 
ballots for voters that use button boxes, large fonts, or other 
accessibility features.  
 
Stark argues that the complexity of the variations that specify a given 
cast ballot, including the votes themselves, the time of day, the amount 
of time spent, and so forth, create a highly dimensional space that 






54 Juan E. Gilbert, Ballot Marking Verification Protocol (unpublished manuscript),  
http://www.juangilbert.com/BallotMarkingVerificationProtocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 
27, 2020). 
55 See Philip B. Stark, There is no Reliable Way to Detect Hacked Ballot-Marking 
Devices (Aug. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/bmd-p19.pdf. 
56 Id.  
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Live tests need to probe every subset of voter preferences, 
BMD settings, and voter interactions with the BMD that could 
alter any contest outcome, and they need to probe every such 
subset enough to have a high probability of detecting any 
changes to selections in that subset.57 
 
a. Thought experiment: The shoulder-surfing auditor 
 
Consider the following thought experiment: we assign auditors to 
voters selected at random from the general voting population. Those 
voters will then do their normal voting process, but an auditor will 
watch them and will double-check the veracity of the printed ballot. 
This means that we are selecting from the distribution of real voters 
rather than from the distribution of all possible voter attributes.  
 
This thought experiment is equivalent to Stark’s “oracle bound.”58 He 
offers as an example an election with 20 BMDs, each of which prints 
140 ballots during an election, for a total of 2800 ballots, of which 14 
ballots have been altered by malware in the BMDs.59 He concludes 
that the shoulder-surfing auditor would need to observe n = 539 voters 
to achieve a 95% chance of detecting the malware.60 Stark uses the 




This equation models a sequence of shoulder-surfing audits. The 
fraction on the left is the probability that the malware survives the first 
audit, which is to say, the probability that the first selected ballot was 
clean, which is slightly less than 1.0. As we move to the right, we’re 





57 Id. at 7.  
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Id. at 10.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
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audit was clean, which we’re thus multiplying together. We’re 
interested in how far to the right we need to get before the malware 
wins with probably less than 5%.  
 
Is Stark’s math correct? How else might we model this? Using the 
previous equation, with  and n = 539, we derive a 
detection probability of 93.29%. Stark’s version is more precise in its 
counting, representing an error in the math of Section 4 of 1.71%.62 As 
the number of ballots cast in the election grows, the results of the two 
equations will converge.  
 
Stark’s argument hinges on his selection of a very small election, with 
only 2800 ballots cast while also selecting a very small fraction of 
malware activity, 0.5%.63 This essay’s live auditing strategy demands a 
fixed number of audits regardless of the total number of ballots cast, 
much like risk limiting audits select a number of ballots as a function 
of the margin of victory, not of the number of ballots cast. Stark’s 
math is correct, but his example is cherry-picked to represent the very 
worst possible case for a live audit on a BMD election.  
 
BMDs seem to be of great interest to large counties and states that will 
use them to collect millions of votes, with smaller counties often 
selecting paper ballots because they do not need BMD-only features 
like support for multiple languages, accessibility features, or thousands 
of distinct ballot styles. Stark’s numbers do not reflect the relative 
effort of live audits as they might be conducted by the kinds of 
election jurisdictions that are favoring BMDs.  
 
VI. Realizing the auditing scheme 
 
Before Stark leaves behind his “oracle bound” model, he dismisses it 
as being “impossibly optimistic.”64 We next consider how realistic this 





62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  




While we cannot assign auditors at random to specific voters, we can 
create a probabilistic model of how real voters will behave. There are 
two parts to a model like this: voting preferences (i.e., what the voter 
ultimately selects in each contest), and machine-observable behaviors 
of the voter (e.g., how slow or fast the voter enters their preferences).  
 
With historical ballots in hand, we can easily construct a probabilistic 
model that reflects how often voters will vote straight-ticket for one 
party or split their ticket; we can differentiate this by precinct, since 
we can examine prior cast ballots on a precinct-by-precinct basis. 
While we cannot connect prior cast ballots with the exact time they 
were cast—the cast ballots should have been randomized—we can still 
look at data from the event logs to determine how long voters took to 
create and cast their ballots. For features that we cannot observe from 
event logs, such as how many times a voter back-tracked and changed 
a preference, we can estimate these features from usability 
experiments.  
 
As such, the challenge for the auditor is to create a “random voter” 
model that reflects all the voters across each voting precinct, including 
their preferences and behaviors. This then produces an auditing script, 
which will express the votes to be selected and the manner in which to 
do it. The script must also specify the time and location of each voting 
machine to be audited.  
 
Political consultants regularly produce detailed models of voter 
behavior, typically used by “get out the vote” campaigns and other 
efforts to influence voter behavior. Similar techniques could be used to 
create the audit scripts. Making this model realistic, for example, 
recognizing that slow input behaviors may correlate with age, and age 
may correlate with party preferences, is a significant part of the 
challenge, but this challenge is still a tractable engineering problem.  
 
a. Down-ballot tampering 
 
Stark also suggests that an attacker might target a down-ballot race, 
where the number of audits that include that race might be quite small. 
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For example, in the Harris County (Houston, Texas) general election 
in November 2018, roughly 1.2 million ballots were cast for statewide 
contests.65 For contrast, voters in the City of Baytown, on the east side 
of Harris County, cast roughly 9,000 votes in their propositions on the 
same ballot.66  
 
The actual election results from Baytown were not close at all. The 
closest contest was decided by a nearly 2:1 margin. A malicious 
attacker would have needed to tamper with roughly 1,500 ballots to 
change its outcome. To be really sure, since the attacker could never 
have had such a precise prediction in advance, the attacker would have 
probably chosen at least 2,000 ballots to tamper. If 300 audits were 
performed, the odds of a county-wide “shoulder-surfing” auditor 
observing one of those tampered 2,000 voters would be roughly 40%. 
In a hypothetical variant of Baytown with a tighter election and only 
400 votes tampered, the odds of observing a tampered vote would be 
only 10%.  
 
These numbers suggest that an election official will need other 
techniques, besides live audits, to detect focused down-ballot 
tampering. We discuss other processes next.  
 
b. Spoiled ballot rates as a signal of problems 
 
Stark analyzes the question of how many spoiled ballots would be 
necessary to represent a statistically significant signal over a base rate 
of “expected” spoiled ballots. He notes that the answer is a function of 
the number of BMDs used; it is actually a function of the number of 
ballots cast, but the math is the same. With an assumed 1% spoilage 





65 HARRIS COUNTY CLERK’S OFF. ELECTION DIVISION, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS — 
GENERAL AND SPECIAL ELECTIONS — NOVEMBER 06, 2018,  at 1, 5 (2018), 
https://harrisvotes.com/HISTORY/20181106/cumulative/cumulative.pdf. 
66 Id. 
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ballots,67 with 74 additional spoiled ballots being a signal that the 
spoilage rate was outside of the 95% confidence interval.  
 
Stark uses an assumption that only 10% of voters would notice BMD-
introduced errors.68 Several researchers have examined this question 
and have found very different results. Matt Bernhard et al. presented 
its participants with varying signage or spoken prompts, yielding 
detection rates as low as 6.5% (with no interventions) and as high as 
71.4% (with the most successful intervention).69 Philip Kortum et al. 
separately considered whether voters attempt to check for errors and, if 
they do, whether they succeed, ultimately finding that 23.1% of their 
voters attempted to do the check and 76% of those successfully found 
an anomaly.70 These studies suggest that, with the right voter prompts 
and instructions, we can achieve much higher than Stark’s 10% 
assumption. 
 
Nonetheless, with Stark’s 10% assumption, he concludes that the 
malware can get away with roughly 730 attacks, corresponding to 
changing the margin of victory by 0.73%; this includes the 
computation that one tampered ballot causes one candidate to lose a 
vote and the other to gain a vote.71 The table below generalizes Stark’s 
math to three different election sizes and three different likelihoods 
that voters will detect tampered ballots and spoil them. The reported 
Margin Δ% indicates the maximum change to a margin of victory that 






67 Until we see large deployments of BMD voting systems, we won't know the actual 
rate of spoiled ballots on these systems and how it varies with other effects, such as 
the size of the ballot. This data is certainly important to collect and study. 
68 Stark, supra note 55, at 13.  
69 Matt Bernhard, Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj, Kevin 
Chang, and J. Alex Halderman, Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot 
Marking Devices?, Proceedings of the 41stst IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, at 
7 (2020).  
70 Philip Kortum, Michael D. Byrne, & Julie Whitmore, Voter Verification of BMD 
Ballots is a Two-Part Question: Can They? Mostly, They Can. Do They? Mostly 
They Don’t, arXiv e-print, (March 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.04997.  
71 Stark, supra note 55, at 13.  





Table 2 shows the impact of increasing the size of the electorate as 
well as increasing the likelihood that voters will notice and spoil 
tampered ballots. For a county-wide contest in Harris County, any 
malware attack that moved the margin of victory more than 0.3%, 
even with Stark’s most pessimistic assumption about voters noticing 
erroneous ballots, would pass the 95% confidence interval on the 
expected ballot spoilage rate. With a more optimistic assumption on 
voters spoiling these ballots, the malware could not hope to move the 
margin of victory by more than six one-hundredths of a percent 
without exceeding the 95% confidence interval.  
 
Consequently, for elections in large jurisdictions, real-time tracking of 
ballot spoilage events should provide an effective mechanism for 
election officials to detect switched-intent attacks. For much smaller 
elections, however, such as Baytown’s local election, a switched-intent 
attack would seem to have more room to operate.  
 
c. Election procedures and emergencies 
 
As discussed in Section III.C and quantified in Section V.D, election 
officials gain power from having situational awareness of the rate of 
ballots being spoiled. With this, election officials can attempt to intuit 
strategies being taken by malware and adaptively create auditing 
580 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
strategies that might catch the malware in the act. If, for example, 
there were an unusually high spoiled ballot rate in Baytown, or if there 
were a hotly contested race there with large political stakes,72 then the 
election official could choose to deploy additional auditors to those 
areas, on top of the baseline of countywide live audits and spoiled 
ballot tracking.  
 
As such, the “game” becomes less like flipping coins and more like 
playing poker. Statistics still play a role, but the players must spend a 
significant amount of energy trying to intuit each other's strategies, 
including bluffing and other forms of subterfuge. Furthermore, this is a 
game where the attacker must move first, committing to a malware 
attack that will have a specific impact on the outcome (whether a 
switched-intent attack or something else). The election official gets to 
make responsive moves up to the day of election, after the voting 
machines are potentially beyond the reach of the attacker.  
 
In the wake of the 2016 election, the Department of Homeland 
Security declared elections to be “critical infrastructure.”73 One of the 
consequences of this is the existence of the Elections Infrastructure 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC),74 creating a 
structured program for the federal government to share threat 
intelligence information with election officials, as well as for election 
officials to aggregate and share such intelligence amongst themselves. 
Certainly, the compressed timetable of elections means that this sort of 





72 Baytown is adjacent to a number of petrochemical refineries, including one of the 
largest in the U.S., owned by Exxon-Mobil, so it's easy to imagine complicated 
politics between the citizens of the city and the industry around them. Baytown 
Refinery, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baytown_Refinery (last modified 
Oct. 7, 2019, 8:56 AM) [https://perma.cc/CAE4-JXW3]; BAYTOWN AREA 
OPERATIONS, EXXONMOBIL (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Locations/United-States/Baytown-area-
operations-overview#aboutUs [https://perma.cc/9PCK-QLQ2]. 
73 ELECTION SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/election-security (last modified Feb. 7, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/G57Z-QGJM]. 
74 EI-ISAC CHARTER, CTR. FOR INTERNET SECURITY, https://www.cisecurity.org/ei-
isac/ei-isac-charter/ [https://perma.cc/6CUA-QSB8].  
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Federal intelligence agencies reach a conclusion that attacks are likely 
in specific states or localities, then EI-ISAC provides the necessary 
infrastructure to disseminate this information, allowing election 
officials to perhaps get ahead of the malware before the election even 
begins.  
 
d. Responding to an emergency 
 
Stark raises this point in his responses, and it is an important issue to 
discuss. While the legal process for managing elections varies from 
state to state, consider what happens when a natural disaster strikes 
right before or during an election. Exactly this happened with 
Hurricane Sandy, which struck the northeastern seaboard on October 
29, 2012, causing notably large damage in New Jersey and New York, 
right before a presidential election. In the wake of this storm, many 
politicians recognized the need for emergency procedures75 and the 
National Association of Secretaries of State began a push to get states 
to adopt laws and procedures to take disasters into account.76 
Ultimately, a cyberattack on an election can and should be treated 
much the same as a hurricane or other natural disaster. If the scope and 
reach of a cyberattack is large enough that the outcome of the election 
is in doubt, then suitable disaster procedures would allow a governor 
to declare an emergency and re-run an election, perhaps with a 
different voting technology. 
  
Note that modern elections are not actually finalized on the night of 
the election, even though losing candidates will customarily concede 
to the victors at the time. Instead, all elections have a canvass period 





75 See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Using Hurricane Sandy as a Lesson for Future 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/nyregion/lessons-from-hurricane-sandy-being-
applied-to-election-planning.html [https://perma.cc/JZ7X-6VUV]. 
76 NAT’L ASS’N OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, STATE LAWS & PRACTICES FOR THE 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF ELECTIONS 4 (2017). 
77 State Election Canvassing Timeframes and Recount Thresholds, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
SECRETARIES OF STATE (2018), https://www.nass.org/resources/ 
2018-election-information/Canvassing-Timeframes-and-Recount-Thresholds. 
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occur, which includes processes like tabulating vote-by-mail ballots 
and resolving provisionally cast ballots. (See, e.g., California’s 
canvass information page78) The canvass period is typically when a 
risk-limiting audit will be conducted, and is also a suitable time for 
cyber-forensics to be conducted on BMDs that were discovered during 
audits or simply flagged by voters spoiling their ballots.  
 
Still, once a vote has been tampered, you cannot determine the intent 
of the voter. So what do you do? Procedurally, this should be no 
different than a ballot box, or potentially a warehouse of every ballot 
box, being lost or destroyed in a flood. It is an emergency, and you 
need emergency procedures to resolve the problem. While it would be 
politically sensitive to declare that a cyberattack damaged an election 
and as such it had to be re-run, the likelihood of an emergency 
response mitigates against the risks of cyberattacks. In other words, if 
the attacker does not think they will get away with it, they are less 
likely to bother with the attack.  
 
VII. Additional arguments 
 
A wide variety of other arguments have been made by Stark and others 
against ballot marking devices. This section tries to respond to these 
arguments.  
 
The adversary will know the election official’s auditing strategy, 
giving them an advantage, Stark notes.79 As discussed in Section 5.2, 
the election official must create an auditing strategy that mirrors the 
real-world distribution of voter’s preferences and behaviors. This will 
inevitably require a sophisticated software tool that constructs an 
auditing script based on real-world data taken from prior elections. If 
this tool and the data it uses are open-source, then the only input that 
the adversary does not know is the random seed that drives the 
production of the audit script. If the model has weaknesses that do not 





78 The Official Canvass of the Vote, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/official-canvass/ [https://perma.cc/H58Q-JAYR]. 
79 Stark, supra note 55, at 12.  
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advantage of these weaknesses. On the flip side, the human auditors 
executing the auditing script will inevitably add randomness on their 
own (e.g., making errors with respect to the scripted vote inputs and 
needing to correct those).  
 
A more serious threat is that the computer generating the auditing 
script is, itself, controlled by the adversary. This can be partly 
mitigated by having multiple, independent computers generating the 
audit script, with the random seed produced by rolling physical dice. 
The resulting scripts should be identical, otherwise we have evidence 
of malware, which again leads us to emergency processes.  
 
These auditing procedures would require significant additional staffing 
and training. Let us again use the November 2018 election in Harris 
County, Texas, to get some realistic numbers. In this election, 
1.2 million votes were cast across a fleet of roughly 10,000 voting 
machines.80 In this election, roughly 29% of ballots were cast on 
Election Day, with 63% of ballots cast during the early voting period.81 
The remaining 8% were absentee postal mail ballots. In the 2019 
general election, there were 52 early voting centers and on Election 
Day there were 750 local voting locations.82  
 
Let us assume that an auditing script for 2020 would follow the same 
distribution of votes that we saw in 2018, with the bulk of ballots cast 
in early voting locations. If we had one audit team (perhaps two 
trained auditors) per early voting location, we would then need 104 
trained auditors. If we want 500 live audits across the full election, 
then this will average out to roughly six audits per early voting 
location, spread across the two-week early voting period, i.e., less than 
one audit per day. As such, the auditors would most likely be regular 






80 HARRIS COUNTY CLERK’S OFF. ELECTION DIVISION, supra note 65.  
81 Id. 
82 Voting Information, HARRIS VOTES, https://www.harrisvotes.com/VotingInfo (last 
visited May 25, 2020).  
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On Election Day, the same 52 teams of auditors could then be charged 
with executing roughly three audits per team, representing a very 
reasonable workload to achieve around 500 audits across the election. 
Even in the case where the probability of a BMD cheating was a low 
1%, this audit would have a 99.34% chance of detecting it (see 
Table 1). It is also straightforward to see these auditors given 
additional auditing tasks, adaptively, as described in Section 6.  
 
These auditing procedures depend on the margin of victory, which is 
not known while the audits are under way. If the final margin of 
victory is larger than the margin used for the audit script, then we will 
have confidence that any possible attack would be smaller than the 
margin of victory, and therefore we have increased confidence in the 
outcome of the election. Conversely, if the final margin of victory is 
smaller than the margin used for the audit script, then the audit process 
might well have missed an attack that could well have changed the 
outcome. 
 
This paper’s analysis shows that live audits plus live tracking of 
spoiled ballots can drive down the available margin for malware to 
tamper with an election result without being detected. This raises a 
related question of whether an adversary might even attempt this sort 
of malware-based attack when other attacks (e.g., tampering with the 
voter registration database, or bombarding social media with 
propaganda) might be more likely to succeed and have a larger impact.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, once the margin of victory gets within 1% 
of the number of votes cast, a variety of other factors come into play, 
particularly around the usability of the voting system.83 BMDs have 
the potential to perform much better than hand-marked paper in these 









83 See, e.g., Sarah P. Everett et al., Electronic Voting Machines versus Traditional 
Methods: Improved Preference, Similar Performance, 2008 CHI PROC. 883.  
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VIII. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
BMDs give us the opportunity to build more sophisticated voting 
systems with “end to end” (e2e) security guarantees.84 While none of 
today’s BMDs have features like this, the research literature has a 
variety of designs that give voters a “receipt” that allows them to prove 
that their vote was correctly included in the final tally (i.e., “counted as 
cast”).85 There are also many clever techniques that can be used to 
audit voting devices to catch them if they are cheating (i.e., verifying 
that voters are “cast as intended”).86 If we ever want to have e2e 
elections, then we will likely require BMD-like devices which produce 
regular paper ballots as well as computing the necessary cryptography.  
 
How realistic is it that e2e will make the jump from the research 
literature to commercial production? To pick one example, Microsoft 
is investing in an open-source toolkit called ElectionGuard,87 and they 
have announced partnerships with many of the vendors of election 
equipment.88 It is quite likely that the next generation of BMDs, and 
perhaps even current-generation BMD hardware with new software, 
will adopt these techniques.  
 
The risks of malware in current-generation BMDs are non-trivial, but 
they can be mitigated through human-centered ballot design, careful 
auditing procedures, and suitable election emergency laws. They also 
keep the door open to new cryptographic techniques, such as used in 
ElectionGuard, that have the potential to protect against a variety of 





84 See, e.g., Susan Bell et al., STAR-Vote: A Secure, Transparent, Auditable, and 
Reliable Voting System, 1 USENIX J. ELECTION TECH. & SYS. 1 (2013). 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Tom Burt, Protecting Democratic Elections Through Secure, Verifiable Voting, 
MICROSOFT (May 6, 2019), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2019/05/06/protecting-democratic-elections-through-secure-verifiable-voting/ 
[https://perma.cc/2PY7-6RVC]. 
88 Tom Burt, Another Step in Testing ElectionGuard, MICROSOFT (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/02/17/wisconsin-electionguard-polls/ 
[https://perma.cc/WLD9-MKKT]. 




Unlike the paperless electronic voting systems that BMDs are being 
purchased to replace, the paper ballots that come out of BMDs give us 
the ability to consider the security procedures contemplated here. 
BMDs are the best technology available today that combines the 
security benefits of paper with the accessibility benefits of computers.  
 
Appendix - A Computing detectable spoiled ballot rates 
 
This short Python program shows how to generate Table 2, here in a 
simple comma-separated-value format. In my attempts to reproduce 
Stark’s numbers, he suggested I use NumPy’s poisson.ppf— the 
Poisson cumulative distribution function—which is more accurate than 
the more commonly used normal approximation to the Poisson 
distribution: . (Wikipedia explains where the number 1.96 
comes from in this equation.89)  
 
from scipy.stats import poisson  
  
print("Detection%,Num ballots,Margin Delta%")  
  
expectedSpoilage = 0.01  
for detectionFraction in [0.1, 0.3, 0.5]:  
    for electionSize in [9000, 200000, 1200000]:  
        mu = electionSize * expectedSpoilage  
        cd = poisson.ppf(0.95, mu)  
        print("%d%%,%d,%.3f%%" %  
          (detectionFraction * 100, electionSize,  
           200.0 * (cd -






89 1.96, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1.96 [https://perma.cc/TS5E-
F2AG] (last modified Mar. 15, 2020). 
